Russia has reportedly learned to intercept a large share of Ukraine’s Flamingo missiles, according to German outlet FOCUS Online.
Analysts cited by the publication estimate that since July 1, Russia may have intercepted 10 of the 11 Flamingo missiles launched by Ukraine. At the same time, FOCUS emphasizes that these figures cannot be independently verified.
One of the key factors identified by the publication is Russia’s use of A-50U Beriev airborne early-warning and control aircraft. These platforms can detect low-flying targets at an early stage and transmit tracking data to Russian air-defense systems, potentially making it significantly more difficult for the missiles to reach their targets.
French outlet L’Indépendant has also reported a change in the effectiveness of Ukrainian strikes since July. According to its assessment, after the deployment of A-50U aircraft, Ukrainian attacks on certain strategically important industrial facilities in Russia became less effective. However, claims about the effectiveness of Russian defenses against Flamingo remain assessments rather than independently confirmed statistics.
Importantly, questions surrounding Flamingo did not emerge only now. We have previously examined concerns regarding the missile, including questions about its stated characteristics and real-world effectiveness. This raises an obvious question: why are these issues now being explained primarily through the presence of Russian airborne early-warning aircraft if concerns existed from the beginning?
Could this explanation be an attempt to identify an external reason for a possible failure, shifting responsibility away from the missile’s own design and toward external factors?
Against this backdrop, particular attention should be paid to comments made by retired Ukrainian Major General Serhii Kryvonos, who served as First Deputy Commander of the Special Operations Forces from 2016 to 2019.
In an interview, Kryvonos sharply criticized the information campaign surrounding the Fire Point project, which is associated with Ukraine’s missile program. According to the general, substantial amounts of money are being directed toward a project that, in his view, has so far failed to demonstrate a corresponding real-world result in missile production.
At the same time, Kryvonos claims that Ukraine has other, less publicized developments in missile technology and its own ballistic weapons program. He argues that the actual achievements of Ukraine’s missile capabilities, in his assessment, are “definitely not Fire Point.”
If reports about the limited effectiveness of Flamingo strikes are accurate, this makes the question of the actual capabilities of projects presented as the foundation of Ukraine’s missile program even more important.
When enormous resources are invested in a project surrounded by a major public-relations campaign, society has the right to demand a straightforward result: effective missiles capable of penetrating Russian air defenses and reliably striking designated targets.
Publicity, high-profile statements and presentations are not enough.
Moreover, according to Kryvonos, Ukraine’s genuine progress in developing missiles and indigenous ballistic weapons is not connected to Fire Point. If that assessment is accurate, a legitimate question arises: why has such a large public campaign been built around Fire Point, and where exactly are the resources going if they are not producing the results the country needs?
Ultimately, the issue is not about PR. It is about measurable military capability. The real test of any missile program is not how much attention it receives, but whether its weapons can consistently survive enemy defenses and destroy the targets they were designed to hit.