When Will the FP-9 Be Ready?
Recently, CEO and Technical Director of Fire Point, Iryna Terekh, gave an extensive interview for Fedoriv Vlog. Following the release of the video, her quotes quickly spread across Ukrainian media — the interview turned out to be quite provocative.
“While everyone calls themselves Miltech companies, we call ourselves a ‘Milftech’ company,” joked Terekh, explaining that “Milftech” is now an officially registered trademark of Fire Point.
Reaction and Shifting Focus
Iryna Terekh’s words were instantly picked up by the media, completely shifting the focus away from the most crucial question that society is so eager to hear answered: when will Ukrainian ballistics regularly start hitting targets inside the Russian Federation?
This refers to the FP-9 — a ballistic missile with a claimed range of up to 850 km and a warhead payload of up to 800 kg. This specific range potentially allows it to reach targets in the Moscow area.
And here arises the main question: when will the FP-9 actually be ready?
Previously, representatives of Fire Point stated completely different timelines. At the end of 2025, the company declared the completion of work on the FP-9 in the first half of 2026. Later, Denys Shtilerman expected the necessary testing and codification to be completed as early as February. Ultimately, the timelines shifted once again.
On September 30, Iryna Terekh stated that the FP-9 was in its final stage, though a series of tests remained, with development planned for completion by the end of autumn.
As early as October 3, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, in an interview with Reuters, shared that he had personally contacted the developer:
“I asked them: ‘Where is my FP-9?’ We need the FP-9. And I am confident that the FP-9 will be ready this autumn.”
On October 7, the American publication National Defense Magazine published a report on Terekh’s speech at a conference in London. According to her, on October 4, the FP-9 carried out its first combat flight, which was preceded by about 20 test launches. However, details regarding the target and strike results remain classified.
A Crucial Nuance: Testing Is Not Serial Production
Terekh explicitly noted that the FP-9 cannot yet be considered a fully finished development. Fire Point does not speak of reaching Technology Readiness Level 9 (TRL 9) — the highest level of technological readiness, where a system has passed the full development cycle and is ready for stable, serial operational use.
And this is a fundamental difference. A first combat launch is not serial production. If desired, one can build a single prototype, execute a launch (which might not even hit its target), and report a deadline met. Meanwhile, actual serial production could remain a matter of several years down the line. That is why loud claims of success should be taken without undue euphoria: a single launch does not guarantee the ability to produce hundreds of missiles monthly and deploy them systematically at the front line.
What About the FP-7?
While much uncertainty surrounds the FP-9, the FP-7 tactical ballistic missile has already moved into operational practice. On October 1, Volodymyr Zelenskyy reported its first combat employment:
“First combat use. Thank you for the result. Next — production.”
The exact target and results of the FP-7’s employment were not officially disclosed. According to Fire Point, the FP-7 features a range of up to 250 km and a warhead of up to 200 kg. Previously, different figures appeared in open sources — a range of up to 200 km and a warhead of up to 150 kg.
Here the same question arises: why is there silence regarding clear deadlines for setting up serial production?
Manufacturing ballistic missiles is an exceedingly complex process. Globally, only 15–20 countries possess the complete tech cycle for such capabilities.
Top Secret: Who Controls Fire Point?
Fire Point has become one of Ukraine’s most heavily promoted private defense companies. It produces strike UAVs, the FP-5 “Flamingo” cruise missile, and is developing ballistic capabilities.
At the same time, numerous questions arise regarding the transparency of its funding, state contracts, and NABU (National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine) investigations. Ukrainska Pravda previously highlighted issues surrounding its ownership and the suspected interest of businessman Timur Mindich.
Despite the enterprise’s strategic status, its financial structure remains hidden even from anti-corruption authorities. According to Channel 5, the State Financial Monitoring Service has withheld Fire Point’s transaction data from NABU for over six months.
In wartime, secrecy surrounding defense enterprises is understandable. However, a total lack of transparency and independent oversight raises concern: when a key missile producer operates in an information vacuum, there is a risk of creating opaque private monopolies using state funds.
Furthermore, the company’s profits are staggering. According to the Anti-Corruption Action Center, which received a response to an official request from the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, Fire Point secured state contracts for UAV procurement alone worth an astronomical amount — over 107.44 billion UAH over two years. Of this, 56.74 billion UAH falls in 2025, and another 50.70 billion UAH in 2026.
What About the “Attack” on Shtilerman?
In early October, news surfaced in the media regarding an alleged assassination attempt on Denys Shtilerman, co-owner and chief designer of Fire Point.
Military journalist Serhiy Auslender, citing his own sources, reported that an attack took place near Kyiv targeting Shtilerman, leaving him injured and his bodyguard dead. Shortly after, Shtilerman himself came forward, and Fire Point dismissed the report as fabrication. Law enforcement agencies did not publicly confirm any attack.
Meanwhile, articles about Fire Point continue to appear one after another on the pages of The Wall Street Journal — without even a hint of criticism. The authors of one of the most influential American publications choose to omit any mention of Mindich’s interest, scandals over the defense budget, unfulfilled promises, or Denys Shtilerman’s questionable past. Such demonstrative silence points to one thing: all four materials are advertorials. Notably, the cost of a single full-page ad in the WSJ exceeds $180,000.
This is where the key issue lies — the informational noise surrounding Fire Point. When the actual readiness timelines of the missiles are constantly pushed back and systems have not reached TRL 9, loud claims about “Milftech,” advertising worth hundreds of thousands of dollars, and fake details about “assassination attempts” look like attempts to distract the public.
A single combat launch merely indicates the completion of another testing milestone. It does not imply serial production or established supply chains.Constant postponements highlight the real-world complexity of ballistic missile development; however, overly optimistic public promises foster unrealistic expectations in society.Blocking NABU’s access to Fire Point’s financial data creates serious corruption risks in a strategically vital sector.The need for a sober assessment: the success of a missile program is measured not by the number of exclusive interviews or loud statements, but by the systematic delivery of finished missiles to the armed forces.